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A BRIGHT IDEA: RECONSTRUCTING FLORIDA’S CLASSROOMS BY 
“DESTIGMATIZING” SPECIAL EDUCATION 
Diva Geltzer 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Florida’s public school system is currently struggling with how to comply with 
the mandates of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) where the 
needs of disabled students and nondisabled students conflict.1 This is concerning 
because as the number of students with disabilities increases, along with the push 
to include students in the general education classroom, the chances of litigation 
also intensify as school personnel and parents debate the appropriate classroom 
placements for various students.2 
Although there are a variety of disabilities afflicting children today, the focus 
of this Comment concerns school-aged children with learning disabilities caused by 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). ASD is a complex developmental disability, 
which affects a person’s ability to communicate and interact with others.3 Autism is 
defined by a certain set of behaviors that affect people in varying degrees based on 
the autism spectrum.4 Currently, in the United States, about 1 in 88 children have 
been diagnosed with ASD; and ASD is 5 times more likely to appear in boys—
about 1 in 54 cases, than in girls—about 1 in 252 cases.5 ASD is present in all 
genders, races, ethnic backgrounds, and socioeconomic groups; hence, children 
with ASD are the largest minority group in the United States.6  
 ________________________  
  J.D. Candidate 2015, Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law; B.S. Advertising, 
University of Florida, 2011. The author would like to thank her parents for their unconditional support.  
 1. See Joanne L. Huston, Inclusion: A Proposed Remedial Approach Ignores Legal and Educational 
Issues, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 249, 254 (1998).   
 2. See Mark F. Kowal, A Call to the Courts to Narrow the Scope of the Definition of Learning Disability 
Within the Americans with Disabilities in Education Act, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 819, 819 (2009).  
 3. About Autism, AUTISM SOCIETY, http://www.autism-society.org/about-autism/ (last visited Jan. 11, 
2014).   
 4. Id. 
 5. Jon Baio, Prevalence of Autism Spectrum Disorders—Autism and Development Disabilities Monitoring 
Network, 14 Sites, United States, 2008, CDC (Mar. 30, 2012), 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss6103a1.htm?s_cid=ss6103a1_w. In South Florida, the 
percentage of eight-year-old children diagnosed with ASD in 2008 based on ethnicity are as follows: Hispanic 
children were diagnosed with ASD at a rate of 52.9%; Caucasian children were diagnosed with ASD at a rate of 
23.9%; African American children were diagnosed with ASD at a rate of 21.5%; and Pacific Islander or Asian 
children were diagnosed with ASD at a rate of 1.5%. Florida Autism and Developmental Disabilities Monitoring 
Project (FL–AADM), CDC FLORIDA, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/states/addm-florida-fact-sheet.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2014).      
 6. Mary Tobin, Put Me First: The Importance of Person-First Language, VCU: VA. DEP’T OF EDUC.’S 
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In order to fully assist this sprawling minority population in the public school 
systems, the purpose of this Comment is to discuss the history behind IDEA and 
how the statutory ambiguity has led to a variety of circuit splits across the United 
States.7 Furthermore, because of the lack of statutory guidance from Congress and 
the courts to feasibly apply the mandates of IDEA, school personnel and parents 
are at odds when determining the appropriate placement for disabled students with 
varying degrees of uniqueness.8 This Comment proposes a proper test for the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to apply in determining the correct classroom 
placements for students with disabilities.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
The congressional intent behind IDEA is to ensure that all children with 
disabilities have an “individualized education program” (IEP) in preparation for 
further education, employment, and independent living.9 As federally mandated, 
schools across the nation are expected to provide to children with disabilities 
meaningful educational opportunities as part of each child’s “free and appropriate 
public education” (FAPE) in the “least restrictive environment” (LRE).10 The 
FAPE requirement of IDEA mandates that any special education program and 
related services provided for the disabled child are free of charge and catered to the 
child’s unique needs.11 In addition, children with disabilities are to be educated 
with nondisabled children to the maximum extent possible under the LRE 
component of IDEA.12 
A.   The History and Predecessors of IDEA  
In the 1970s, Congress passed the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) 
and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA) to respond to the 
widespread recognition of the rights of handicapped children to an appropriate 
education.13 Although the EHA did not achieve its goals, it marked the start of 
significant efforts by the federal government to include disabled children in public 
schools.14 In response to the inadequacies of the EHA, the EAHCA mandated that 
schools shall not discriminate against children based on their handicaps and 
schools must provide special education programs for disabled students to benefit 
  
Kathie Snow, New Ways of Thinking, DISABILITY IS NATURAL, http://www.disabilityisnatural.com/ (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2014)).  
 7. See Kowal, supra note 2, at 819–20. 
 8. See id. 
 9. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (West 2010).  
 10. See id.; 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1412(a)(1)(A), (5)(A) (West 2005).  
 11. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401(9)(A)–(D) (West 2010).  
 12. § 1412(a)(5)(A). 
 13. Enforcing the Right to an Appropriate Education: The Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 
1975, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1103 (1979).   
 14. Megan Roberts, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Why Considering Individuals One at a 
Time Creates Untenable Situations for Students and Educators, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1048 (2008).   
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academically.15 To achieve this goal, the EAHCA mandated three requirements 
that have survived subsequent amendments to EAHCA and IDEA: (1) students 
with disabilities must receive an individualized education program; (2) schools 
must provide disabled students with a free and appropriate public education; and 
(3) education must be satisfied in the least restrictive environment most suitable for 
each disabled student.16  
B.   IDEA and Subsequent Amendments to IDEA 
In 1990, the EAHCA was renamed IDEA; and under IDEA, schools are now 
required to provide technology aids and services to disabled students.17 Also under 
IDEA, schools are now required to provide disabled students with transition 
services once the students graduate from the public school system.18  
The 1997 and 2004 amendments to IDEA were very minor, yet the 
congressional intent regarding the least restrictive environment requirement called 
for “mainstreaming” the disabled students with their nondisabled peers to the 
maximum extent appropriate.19 With mainstreaming, there is a rebuttable 
presumption in that the placement of the disabled student with their nondisabled 
peers is appropriate.20 This presumption may be overcome if the nature of a 
student’s disability is so severe that, even with the help of supplemental aids and 
services, education cannot be achieved satisfactorily.21 In order for a disabled 
student’s placement in the mainstream classroom to be challenged, a statement 
describing how the disability is affecting the student’s progress in the mainstream 
classroom must be stipulated before a change in placement occurs.22 Today, the 
terms “mainstreaming” and “mainstream classroom” are no longer used and have 
been replaced by the term “inclusion.”23  
 ________________________  
 15. Id.   
 16. Id.   
 17. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 901, 104 Stat. 1103, 1141–
42 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–85 (2010)); see Roberts, supra note 14, at 1049. 
 18. Id.     
 19. See S. REP. NO. 105-17, at 11 (1997). 
 20. See id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)–(iii) (West 2005). The first step in ensuring that a disabled student 
receives a free and appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment under IDEA is to develop an 
individualized education program (IEP) annually. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51 (2005) 
(citing § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)). The IEP is an annual description of how the student with the disability will progress 
and meet their goals in the general education curriculum. §§1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)–(II). The IEP will also contain an 
explanation to the extent that the child will not participate with the nondisabled children in the mainstreamed 
classroom, and if there are any appropriate accommodations necessary to measure the academic achievement and 
functional performance of the child based on state assessments. §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(V)–(VI)(aa). Under IDEA, the 
IEP team discussing the disabled student’s education program for the course of the year will consist of the parents 
of the disabled student, at least one regular classroom teacher of the disabled student, at least one special education 
teacher, a representative of the local educational agency qualified to supervise a specially designed instruction to 
meet the needs of disabled students, an individual who can interpret the evaluation results, and if the circumstances 
permit, the disabled student will be a part of the IEP meeting. §§ 1414(d)(1)(B)(i)–(vii).  
 23. Anne Proffitt Dupre, Disability and the Public Schools: A Case Against “Inclusion”, 72 WASH. L. 
REV. 775, 779 (1997).  
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In 2004, IDEA was renamed Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Improvement Act (IDEIA), which did not substantively change IDEA from the 
previous 1997 amendment.24 However, one important change that resulted under 
IDEIA is that now school districts can recover attorneys’ fees when parents file 
frivolous or unreasonable suits against the school districts.25 
Despite the amendments to IDEA and the presumption that inclusion in the 
general education classroom is a satisfactory placement for the disabled student, 
there is a lack of clarity in the statute addressing the issue of what happens when 
the disabled students and the nondisabled students have conflicting needs, 
rendering the teacher incapable of meeting the needs of the entire class.26 The 
statute provides little guidance in determining when it is no longer appropriate to 
include the disabled student in the nondisabled classroom.27  
C.   Requirements Under IDEA 
Since the enactment of EAHCA of 1975, IDEA has fully adopted the 
proposition that a free and appropriate public education will be provided to 
students with disabilities to improve their educational goals.28 In order for the 
school districts to provide disabled students with a free and appropriate public 
education, students with disabilities must have access to the general educational 
curriculum with their nondisabled peers to the maximum extent appropriate.29 The 
ability for the disabled student to have access to the general educational curriculum 
is the least restrictive environment requirement of IDEA, which will only be 
altered to a more restrictive environment if the child is not benefitting from the 
curriculum, even with the help of aids and services.30 Although IDEA is seemingly 
definitive, there is much litigation over how to interpret “free” and “appropriate” 
public education in the “least restrictive environment.”31 This is largely because 
each student with a disability has unique needs, and it is nearly impossible to enact 
legislation that is uniform and applicable to all disabled students.  
1.   Free and Appropriate Public Education Under IDEA 
Under IDEA, a “free” education means any special education or related service 
that is provided for the disabled student at the public expense without charge to the 
student or the student’s family.32 The special education curriculum must meet the 
standards of the State’s educational agency and in conformity with the disabled 
 ________________________  
 24. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-466, 118 Stat. 
2647 (2004) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2005)); see Roberts, supra note 14, at 1051.  
 25. Id.     
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. at 1054. 
 28. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)(3) (West 2010).  
 29. § 1400(c)(5)(A).  
 30. See id.; see S. REP. NO. 105-17, at 11 (1997), see also 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1412(a)(1)(A), (5)(A) (West 
2005).  
 31. See Roberts, supra note 14, at 1054. 
 32. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(9)(A) (West 2010). 
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student’s individualized education program.33 The “free” requirement of a free and 
appropriate public education is the least litigated component under IDEA.34 
However, the “appropriate” component is more frequently litigated because 
each student’s disability is unique and so a placement deemed appropriate for one 
student may be inappropriate for another student with a seemingly similar 
disability.35 In order to determine what placement, aid, or service is necessary for 
each disabled student, an individualized education program will be assembled, with 
the help of an IEP team, to determine how the student with the disability will 
progress and reach his or her goals for that particular school year.36 The IEP team 
will determine the appropriateness of the placement for each disabled student and 
whether or not supplemental aids and services will be necessary.37 Nevertheless, 
there are times when members of the IEP team disagree regarding the educational 
curriculum and academic goals of a particular student with a disability, causing 
legal disputes to arise.38  
 ________________________  
 33. §§ 1401(9)(B)–(D). 
 34. Roberts, supra note 14, at 1053.  
 35. Id. at 1052.     
 36. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(1)(A)–(B) (West 2005). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Roberts, supra note 14, at 1052. If parents of the disabled student and the school administrators 
disagree regarding the educational curriculum discussed during the IEP meeting, the preliminary recourse would 
first be to have a sequential meeting with the IEP team to resolve the conflict. If a sequential meeting with the IEP 
team does not work, the parties must fulfill all the procedural safeguards set forth under section 1415 of IDEA. 20 
U.S.C.A. § 1415 (West 2005). In general, either party may voluntarily request to attend mediation as a preliminary 
recourse. §§ 1415(e)(1)–(2). Once mediation is requested by either party, then a qualified and impartial mediator 
must facilitate the proceeding. § 1415(e)(2)(A)(iii). Lastly, the State shall bear the costs of the mediation process. 
§ 1415(e)(2)(D). In the event that a resolution is reached after the mediation process, the parties shall execute a 
legally binding and enforceable agreement. § 1415(e)(2)(F).    
If the parties are unable to resolve the issues that arose during the IEP meeting, then the parties may request an 
impartial due process hearing, which is conducted by the State or educational agency. § 1415(f)(1)(A). However, 
prior to the impartial due process hearing, the parents shall have a meeting with another member from the IEP 
team, who knows of the specific facts stipulated in the complaint, within fifteen days of receiving notice of the 
complaint. §§ 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(I)–(IV).  
If this preliminary hearing does not resolve the issues stipulated in the complaint to the satisfaction of the parents 
within thirty days, the school district receives the complaint, then the impartial due process hearing may occur 
within two years of the alleged action which formed the basis of the complaint. §§ 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii), (3)(C). If the 
parties are able to reach a settlement after the impartial due process hearing and it is signed by both parties, then 
this agreement is legally binding and enforceable. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii).  
The hearing officer shall make a decision based on substantive grounds regarding whether or not the disabled child 
received a free and appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment possible. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i). If 
the hearing officer finds that there has been a procedural violation, the hearing officer will look to see if the 
disabled child was deprived of a free and appropriate public education and whether this procedural violation 
caused a deprivation of educational benefits. §§ 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)(I)–(III). If either party is aggrieved by the 
findings and decisions rendered during the impartial due process hearing, then such party may appeal the decision 
to the State educational agency, and the State educational agency shall conduct a review of the decision appealed. 
§§ 1415(g)(1)–(2). 
If no settlement is reached, any aggrieved party may bring a civil action after filing a complaint in either a state 
court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without regard to the amount in 
controversy. § 1415(i)(2)(A). The party bringing the action shall have ninety days from the date of the decision of 
the hearing officer to file a complaint. § 1415(i)(2)(B). The court will also require the records of the administrative 
proceedings and any additional evidence. §§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(i)–(ii). Lastly, the court will base its decision on the 
preponderance of the evidence and grant relief that the court deems appropriate. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).    
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2.   Least Restrictive Environment Under IDEA 
Under IDEA, students with disabilities, to the maximum extent possible, are to 
be included in the same classroom with their nondisabled peers, unless there is a 
finding that even with supplemental aids and services, serious education cannot be 
achieved satisfactorily.39 The LRE requirement determines the appropriate 
classroom placement for the disabled student and whether that student will receive 
some educational benefit with the help of supplemental aids and services.40 The 
LRE requirement is also a highly litigated topic because there is no uniform 
standard to be applied as each disabled student is uniquely situated.41 Much of the 
litigation revolves around parents alleging that the school districts deprived their 
child of a free and appropriate public education as their child was placed in a more 
restrictive environment, as opposed to having their child included with the 
student’s nondisabled peers.42 
The proponents favoring inclusion, which are typically the parents, claim that 
by allowing the disabled students to remain and participate in the same classroom 
with their nondisabled peers, the entire classroom will benefit in learning concepts 
of freedom, equality, and community.43 As a consequential benefit of including the 
disabled student in the general education classroom, the disabled student will learn 
from his or her nondisabled peers through observation and emulating their 
behavior.44 Fully included disabled students will also develop the skills necessary 
to succeed; as a result, the disabled students will experience an increase in their 
self-esteem and perform substantially better academically.45 Overall, by educating 
both the disabled students and nondisabled students together, the nondisabled 
students will learn to be more tolerant and accepting of their disabled peers, 
thereby destroying the cycle of separation.46 Lastly, advocates of inclusion fear that 
if disabled students are not included with their nondisabled peers, those disabled 
students will have less self-esteem due to their cognizance of the separation.47 
The critics of the full inclusion philosophy claim that a uniform standard for 
placing disabled students and nondisabled students in the same general education 
classroom is unrealistic and runs contrary to the individualized principles under 
IDEA.48 Full inclusion also detracts from the purpose and observations made 
during the IEP meeting because it groups both nondisabled students and disabled 
 ________________________  
 39. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (West 2005).  
 40. See Roberts, supra note 14, at 1054 (citing § 1412(a)(5)(A)).   
 41. Id. 
 42. See id.     
 43. Stacey Gordon, Making Sense of the Inclusion Debate Under IDEA, 2006 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 189, 210–
11 (2006) (citing Colleen P. Tomko, What is Inclusion?, KIDS TOGETHER, INC., 
http://www.kidstogether.org/inclusion.htm (last modified June 29, 2010)).     
 44. Id. at 211 (citing JEAN B. CROCKETT & JAMES M. KAUFFMAN, THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE 
ENVIRONMENT: ITS ORIGINS AND INTERPRETATION IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 21 (Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc. 1999)).  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Id. at 212 (citing Dupre, supra note 23, at 824). 
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students together, regardless of the disability impacting the student.49 While full 
inclusion advocates purport the idea that full inclusion will decrease the social 
stigma of intolerance by having both disabled and nondisabled students placed 
together, the reality is that even in the general education classroom, the disabled 
students and the nondisabled students are still essentially separated, highlighting 
the disabled students’ differences.50 The notion that fully including disabled 
students with their nondisabled peers will essentially cure the disabled student 
through observation and emulation is not only completely erroneous, but it 
underscores the emphasis on societal acceptance.51 All students should be taught 
acceptance of others, regardless of what classroom students receive their 
instruction.  
In addition, inclusion detracts the teacher’s attention away from the disabled 
students as the teacher must continue with his or her lesson plans; this creates an 
environment where the disabled students are not receiving enough individualized 
attention from the teacher, causing the disabled students to suffer academically.52 
As a result, a student with a disability who is not receiving enough individualized 
attention from the teacher may likely disrupt the classroom, thereby hindering the 
other students from serious learning.53 
D.   Florida’s Adoption of IDEA 
The State Board of Education in Florida has fully adopted IDEA and must 
comply with its subsequent amendments and regulations, which include providing 
disabled students with a free and appropriate public education in the least 
restrictive environment.54 In Florida, the school districts are required to focus on 
including children with disabilities to the maximum extent appropriate in the 
general education classroom unless the nature of the student’s disability is such that 
education would be satisfactorily achieved in a more restrictive classroom.55  
Before a student with a disability is transferred to a more restrictive placement 
or given supplemental aids or services, the student must first undergo an evaluation 
to determine whether the student qualifies as an exceptional student.56 After the 
evaluation is completed, the student’s parent is notified of whether or not the 
student is eligible to be an exceptional student.57 In addition, the parent is notified 
of his or her ability to request “a due process hearing on the identification, 
evaluation, and eligibility determination” of his or her child.58 An administrative 
law judge (ALJ) from the Division of Administration Hearings must conduct the 
 ________________________  
 49. Gordon, supra note 43, at 212. 
 50. Id. at 212–13. 
 51. See id. at 213 (citing Dupre, supra note 23, at 820). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 213–14 (citing Dupre, supra note 23, at 849–51). 
 54. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1003.571(1)(a)–(c) (West 2009).  
 55. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1003.57(1)(a)(2), (1)(e) (West 2013).  
 56. § 1003.57(1)(c).  
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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due process hearing; and the decision of the ALJ is final.59 However, any aggrieved 
party “has the right to bring a civil action in the state circuit court.”60 The court, in 
such a civil action, must receive the records of the due process hearing, and the 
court must hear any additional evidence at the insistence of either party.61 During 
the pendency period, the student is required to remain in his or her current 
classroom.62 
Once the student is found to have a disability, the student must have an IEP, 
which shall be completed with the consent and presence of the parent at the IEP 
meeting.63 During the meeting, the parent has the right to accept or refuse actions, 
such as placing the student in an exceptional student education center or 
administering an alternative assessment to the student.64 A school district may not 
proceed with any actions to the student without parental consent; unless, the school 
district can prove that it had to act and tried to obtain parental consent using 
reasonable means, but the parent failed to respond.65 If a change in the student’s 
IEP is necessary, the school must hold an IEP team meeting with the parent.66 The 
school must give the parent written notice of the IEP team meeting at least ten days 
prior to the IEP meeting,67 and the only way the meeting can be waived is through 
informed consent of the parent after the parent receives written notice of the IEP 
team meeting.68  
Recently, the Florida Senate passed Bill Number 1108, which will expand 
parental rights in matters relating to the classroom placement and special needs and 
services of their child.69 Parents will now be allowed to invite another person to 
attend an IEP meeting, and the school district personnel may not object to the 
attendance of such adult through any action or statement.70 While permitting 
parents to bring another adult to their child’s IEP meeting may sound seemingly 
appropriate, there have been instances of unbecoming aggression on behalf of such 
adults advocating for the child.71 In such instances, a school district should not be 
hindered in controlling unwarranted aggression during IEP meetings, and this 
extended right given to parents may present itself as being a superfluous barricade 
on the school district personnel. 
 ________________________  
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1003.57(1)(d) (West 2013). 
 63. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1003.5715(1) (West 2013). 
 64. § 1003.5715(2)(a). 
 65. § 1003.5715(3). 
 66. § 1003.5715(4). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See S.B. 1108, 115th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Robert K. Crabtree, Mistakes People Make—Advocates, FETAWEB.COM, 
http://www.fetaweb.com/02/mistakes.advocates.crabtree.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2014) (explaining situations in 
which non-lawyer advocates, such as another adult, may be overcome with: “excessive emotion that clouds 
judgment; giving advice in areas beyond the advocate’s expertise; over-involvement in a case where the parents 
would be better off doing things for themselves; raising parents’ expectations beyond what is feasible; and feeding 
parents’ sense of outrage rather than helping them cultivate a calm, persistent approach”). 
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III.  UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S CONSTRUAL OF IDEA 
In 1982, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Board of Education of 
Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, which established a two-
pronged test to determine whether a school district has complied with providing 
students with a free and appropriate public education in the least restrictive 
environment to the maximum extent possible.72 The first inquiry is a procedural 
determination, in which a court must ascertain whether the State has complied with 
the procedures in IDEA.73 The second inquiry must be of substantive nature, and 
the court must determine whether the IEP is reasonably calculated to enable the 
student to receive some basic floor of educational benefit.74 If the school district 
complies with these requirements under IDEA, then the school district has met its 
burden and the court can require nothing further.75 
In Rowley, Amy Rowley, a deaf student at Furnace Woods School, had 
“minimal residual hearing” and could lip-read with utmost accuracy.76 Amy’s IEP 
provided that she should be educated in a general education classroom with the use 
of a hearing aid, have supplemental education with a tutor for the deaf one hour 
each day, and a speech therapist for three hours each week.77 The Rowleys agreed 
with much of the IEP, but also insisted on having a sign-language interpreter 
present in all of Amy’s academic classes.78 However, the sign-language interpreter 
and the school’s administration found that Amy did not need such additional 
services because she was already receiving top marks in her academic classes and 
progressing socially.79 Frustrated due to the denial of a sign-language interpreter 
present in Amy’s classes, the Rowleys brought suit after exhausting the procedural 
remedies.80 
The District Court for the Southern District of New York found that, although 
Amy was top in her class and a “well-adjusted child,” the fact that Amy had a 
handicap causing her to hear considerably less than what she would hear without 
her handicap, it was necessary for the sign-language interpreter to be present in 
Amy’s classes.81 The disparity between Amy’s achievement and her potential 
caused her not to receive a free and appropriate public education when compared to 
her nondisabled peers.82 As a result, the district court found in favor of the 
 ________________________  
 72. See Roberts, supra note 14, at 1058 (citing Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., 
Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982)).  
 73. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 
(1982). 
 74. Id. at 206–07. 
 75. Id. at 207. 
 76. Id. at 184. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. 
 79. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184–85. 
 80. Id. at 185. 
 81. See id.  
 82. Id. at 185–86. 
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Rowleys, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed 
the lower court’s decision.83 
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and remanded the holding to 
the lower court, finding that a “free [and] appropriate public education consists of 
[a specially designed] educational [program] to meet the unique needs of the 
handicapped child.”84 There is no additional requirement that a school district 
provide supplemental services to maximize each student’s potential in comparison 
to other students.85 The legislative intent is not to achieve equality of opportunity 
between disabled students and nondisabled students—that would be an “entirely 
unworkable standard requiring impossible measurements and comparisons.”86 
Instead, the purpose of the Act is to provide disabled students with a “basic floor of 
opportunity” to receive some educational benefit in their classes—not to equalize 
or maximize their potential in comparison to nondisabled students.87 The lower 
courts erred by applying an impracticable standard.88  
The decision in Rowley, though helpful in explaining congressional intent 
pertaining to what is a free and appropriate public education, left many unanswered 
inquiries, including an assessment for setting forth the “least restrictive 
environment” requirement.89 Amy Rowley is a bright girl that received top marks 
in her classes, and so the Court did not need to determine whether her placement in 
the general education classroom was appropriate because it was obvious that her 
placement was suitable based on her top academic performance.90 However, many 
other students with disabilities are not as gifted and will need further academic 
assistance and a separate placement from their nondisabled peers. Rowley, although 
the seminal case in special education law,91 still provides lower courts with little 
guidance in how to determine what an appropriate “least restrictive environment” 
is for a broad range of students under IDEA.  
IV.  THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S 
“FAPE/LRE” TWO-PRONGED TEST 
 
Since the enactment of EAHCA in 1975 and IDEA in 1990, federal law 
mandates that each state provide students with disabilities a free and appropriate 
public education in the least restrictive environment to the maximum extent 
possible.92 As a result, the various Circuit Courts of Appeals of the United States 
 ________________________  
 83. Id. at 186. 
 84. Id. at 188–89, 210. 
 85. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189–90. 
 86. Id. at 198. 
 87. Id. at 200. 
 88. See id. 
 89. Roberts, supra note 14, at 1058. 
 90. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209–10. 
 91. See generally id. (created the two-pronged test to determine whether a school district complied with the 
free and appropriate public education requirements under IDEA’s statutory mandates). 
 92. Roberts, supra note 14, at 1057 (citing 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1412(a)(1)(A), (5)(A) (West 2005)). 
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have interpreted IDEA differently using varying tests and many circuit court splits 
have ensued.93 This has led to volatile outcomes in the law and unequal results for 
students with disabilities in determining whether a student has received a free and 
appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment.94 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Greer v. Rome City School District 
has adopted the two-pronged test established in Daniel R.R. v. State Board of 
Education of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, to determine what is an 
appropriate least restrictive environment.95 Overall, this two-pronged test considers 
whether a disabled student will receive a meaningful educational benefit from the 
general education classroom, thus supporting a heightened preference towards 
inclusion.96 The first inquiry under the two-pronged test is, “whether education in 
the [general education] classroom, with the use of supplemental aids and services, 
can be achieved satisfactorily” for a given disabled student.97 If the school cannot 
provide satisfactory education in the general education classroom and the school 
intends to provide education in a more restrictive environment, then the second 
inquiry the court must make is, “whether the school has [included] the [student] to 
the maximum extent appropriate.”98 
Under the first prong, the court must determine “whether the school district has 
taken steps to accommodate the [disabled student] in the [general education] 
classroom.”99 If the State has failed to take such accommodating measures, the 
court’s inquiry ends; and the State will be found in violation of IDEA’s “express 
mandate to supplement and modify” the general education curriculum.100 IDEA 
will not permit the State to make “mere token gestures to accommodate” disabled 
students; yet the State is relieved from providing every conceivable aid or service 
to assist the student.101 To resolve the issue of the first inquiry, the court must 
examine several components to determine whether education would be achieved 
satisfactorily in the general education classroom.102 No single factor is dispositive, 
nor is this list of factors exhaustive.103 
The first component the court will analyze in determining the appropriateness 
of the disabled student’s placement is through a comparison of educational benefits 
in the general education classroom, supplemented by aids and services—versus a 
special education classroom in a more restrictive environment.104 However, a 
disabled student will not necessarily be transferred from a general education 
classroom to a special education classroom simply because of poor academic 
 ________________________  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 696 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of 
Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989)).  
 96. Roberts, supra note 14, at 1063. 
 97. Greer, 950 F.2d at 696 (quoting Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Greer, 950 F.2d at 697. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
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performance.105 Although the student with a disability might perform better 
academically in a special education classroom, the court will not mandate a switch 
in placement if the student would receive “considerable non-academic 
benefit[s].”106 Such non-academic benefits the court will scrutinize include 
language improvement and “role modeling” from the student’s nondisabled 
peers.107 Nevertheless, if the student fails to improve academically through 
inclusion in the general education classroom, while the student’s potential peers are 
progressing in the special education classroom, then inclusion may be 
disadvantageous to the student.108  
The second component the court will evaluate is “what effect the presence of 
the [disabled student] in a [general education] classroom would have on the 
education of [the] other [nondisabled students] in that classroom.”109 If a disabled 
student is so disruptive that serious education is being severely impaired for the 
nondisabled students, then inclusion into the general education classroom would 
not be an appropriate placement for the disabled student.110  
The third component the court may consider is the cost of educating the 
disabled student in the general education classroom with the assistance of 
supplemental aids and services.111 A school district cannot simply refuse to educate 
a disabled student in a general education classroom because the cost of doing so, 
with the appropriate aids and services, would be incrementally more expensive 
than educating the student in a special education classroom.112 Conversely, it would 
be flagrant for a school district to provide a disabled student with his or her own 
personal teacher, even if it would allow the student to perform adequately in the 
general education classroom.113 In essence, the third component is a balancing test 
to determine how great the cost of educating the disabled student is in the general 
education classroom.114 If the cost is too high, relative to the cost of educating other 
similarly situated students in the general education classroom in the same district, 
then perhaps including the student in the general education classroom is 
inappropriate.115 
In Greer, Christy Greer, a child with Down’s Syndrome, was five years old in 
1986 when her parents decided to enroll her in kindergarten at Elm Street 
Elementary School.116 The Greers noted that Christy had a disability on her 
registration form and when the school opted to evaluate Christy, the Greers 
refused.117 The Greers were under the presumption that if Christy was evaluated, 
 ________________________  
 105. See id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Greer, 950 F.2d at 697.  
 109. Id.  
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.  
 114. See Greer, 950 F.2d at 697.  
 115. See id. 
 116. Id. at 690. 
 117. Id. 
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the results would be predetermined; Christy would have to attend a special 
education school other than Elm Street Elementary School.118 Christy did not 
attend kindergarten at Elm Street Elementary School for the 1986–87 school year, 
but instead was homeschooled.119 Then, when Christy was seven years old, the 
Greers decided to enroll Christy at Elm Street Elementary School for the 1988–89 
school year, and the school again sought to evaluate Christy.120 Although the 
Greers resisted the evaluation of their daughter, the school sought an evaluation 
after the administrative proceeding, which showed that Christy was “a moderately 
mentally handicapped child and that she had significant deficits in language and 
articulation skills.”121 
In January 1989, the school personnel and the Greers held a meeting to discuss 
Christy’s IEP for the following year and to make a placement determination.122 The 
school’s psychologist explained to the Greers that, although Christy would make 
some academic progress in the general education classroom, Christy would make 
more academic progress in a special education classroom working with teachers 
who are better equipped to work with children with Down’s Syndrome.123 The 
Greers again resisted the School District’s placement recommendation for Christy 
because their daughter would not have “peer models” to emulate, leading her to be 
cognitively deprived and cheated of an opportunity to a true education.124 
In February 1989, the School District initiated an administrative proceeding to 
determine Christy’s placement under the EAHCA of 1975.125 A regional hearing 
officer held a hearing after one month to discuss Christy’s IEP and the School 
District’s recommendations for placement at an alternative elementary school.126 
While the School District offered no evidence showing that Christy may be 
educated at Elm Street Elementary School in a general education classroom with 
supplemental aids and services, the regional hearing officer rendered the decision 
in favor of the School District—claiming that Christy could not progress in the 
general education classroom and could academically progress in a special 
education curriculum.127 Although this decision was appealed to the state hearing 
officer, the decision was affirmed.128 
The Greers filed a civil action in the District Court for the Northern District of 
Georgia in July of 1989; and during this time, Christy spent one year in a general 
education kindergarten classroom without the support of supplemental aids and 
services.129 The district court ruled in favor of the Greers and held that the School 
District, with the assistance of supplemental aids and services, could appropriately 
 ________________________  
 118. Id. at 690–91. 
 119. Id. at 691. 
 120. Greer, 950 F.2d at 691. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 691–92. 
 125. Id. at 692. 
 126. See Greer, 950 F.2d at 692. 
 127. Id. at 693. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
13
Geltzer: A Bright Idea: Reconstructing Florida's Classrooms by "Destigmati
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2014
120 Barry Law Review Vol. 20, No. 1 
 
educate Christy in a general education classroom.130 Furthermore, Christy’s 
proposed IEP was not in compliance under the EAHCA because it called for 
placement in a special education classroom, which does not fulfill the “least 
restrictive environment” requirement.131 Both parties appealed to the Eleventh 
Circuit.132 
In applying the two-pronged test established in Daniel R.R., the Eleventh 
Circuit found that the School District failed to satisfy the first prong, which 
questions whether Christy could be satisfactorily educated in the general education 
classroom with the assistance of supplemental aids and services.133 Due to the fact 
that this prong was not addressed by the School District in Christy’s IEP nor in the 
administrative proceeding presented in the district court, the Eleventh Circuit did 
not address the second inquiry of the two-pronged test.134 In support of the 
Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion, the Court found that the School District did not take 
steps to accommodate Christy in the general education classroom since Christy was 
not provided with any itinerant instruction or a resource room that could have 
assisted her while she was in kindergarten.135 Additionally, the School District 
automatically came to the determination in the IEP that because Christy was 
mentally impaired, she belonged in a self-contained special education classroom, 
without considering the possibility that Christy may benefit from being in a general 
education classroom with some accommodations.136 
Nevertheless, after Greer was decided in December of 1991, the opinion was 
withdrawn and remanded back to the district court in March of 1992 because there 
was uncertainty as to whether the district court’s ruling was final in regard to the 
Greers’ demands for (1) reimbursement of costs for educational services and 
independent assessments of Christy, and (2) reimbursement of costs for 
compensatory education services that were improperly delayed during the course of 
litigation.137 “The [S]chool [D]istrict contended . . . that the Greers abandoned at 
least one of these [two] claims,” but the record is unclear as to which claim the 
Greers abandoned.138 As a result, the Eleventh Circuit remanded this case on a 
technicality to the district court to determine whether the Greers’ claims for 
reimbursement of educational services, or independent assessments had been 
abandoned.139 If these claims were still viable, then the district court must then 
render a decision and end this litigation on its merits.140 
On May 18, 1992, the district court promptly abandoned or finalized the 
unanswered demands the Greers made after the Eleventh Circuit remanded the 
 ________________________  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. 
 132. See Greer, 950 F.2d at 693–94. 
 133. Id. at 699. 
 134. See id. at 698. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 956 F.2d 1025, 1026–27 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 138. Id. at 1026 (citing Greer, 950 F.2d at 694 n.11). 
 139. Id. at 1026–27. 
 140. Id. at 1027. 
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case.141 The Eleventh Circuit, on July 15, 1992, reinstated its previous opinion 
rendered on December 26, 1991, in Greer.142 Despite the “bouncing-nature” of 
Greer, the two-pronged test the Eleventh Circuit adopted in Daniel R.R. is still 
viable, in addition to the non-exhaustive list of factors.143  
V.  INCONSISTENCIES IN APPLICATION OF GREER’S FAPE/LRE TEST IN 
FLORIDA DISTRICT COURTS 
As the number of students with disabilities rises, the notion that inclusion in 
the general education classroom is the preferred method of instruction also rises.144 
Additionally, frustration and grievances will likely increase given that more 
students with disabilities are included in the general education classroom with their 
nondisabled peers.145 Teachers are spending much of their energies planning and 
modifying the general education curriculum to adapt to the needs of the disabled 
students, when the academic and non-academic benefits the disabled students gain 
are minimal at best.146 As a result of the increasing demands on the teacher, it is 
possible that less quality attention is given to the nondisabled students in the 
classroom, as the disabled students will require more individualized attention.147 
Furthermore, the amount of “quality” social interaction between the disabled and 
nondisabled students is diminished when the teacher ascribes completely different 
assignments for the disabled and nondisabled students.148  
 ________________________  
 141. Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 470 (11th Cir. 1992).  
 142. Id. 
 143. See K.I. ex rel. Jennie I. v. Montgomery Pub. Sch., 805 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1296–97 (M.D. Ala. 2011) 
(citing Greer, 950 F.2d at 696–97); see Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. A.V. ex rel. W.V., 961 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1264–
66 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (citing Greer, 950 F.2d at 696–97). In order to determine whether a student’s IEP provides for 
a free and appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment, the court will use a two-prong test. Id. 
at 1264.  
Under the first prong, the court must inquire, “whether education in [a general education] classroom, with the 
[assistance] of supplemental aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily.” Id. at 1265 (quoting Greer, 950 
F.2d at 696). If the school district violates this first prong by refusing to provide education in a general education 
classroom, with the assistance of supplemental aids and services, then the school district has violated IDEA’s 
requirement that disabled students should be included in the general education curriculum to the maximum extent 
possible. Id. In addition, the court’s inquiry would be complete, and the court would not need to analyze the 
second prong. Id. 
However, if the disabled student was included in the general education program, with the assistance of 
supplemental aids and services, then the court must ask, “whether the school [district] has [included] the [student] 
to the maximum extent appropriate.” Id. (quoting Greer, 950 F.2d at 696). 
When determining whether the first prong is met, the court will look at a non-exhaustive list of components 
stipulated in Greer. See Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1266 (citing Greer, 950 F.2d at 697). First, the 
court will engage in a balancing test to determine whether the disabled student would benefit more academically 
by being included in a general education classroom, with the assistance of supplemental aids and services, or 
rather would the disabled student benefit more academically via placement in a more restrictive environment, such 
as a special education classroom. Id. Secondly, the court will evaluate “what effect the presence of the [disabled] 
student in [the general education] classroom would have on the education of other [nondisabled] students in that 
classroom.” Id. Lastly, the court will assess the cost of supplemental aids and services essential to suitably educate 
the student in a general education classroom. Id.  
 144. Roberts, supra note 14, at 1080. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See Dupre, supra note 23, at 848–49. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
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This presumption that inclusion in the general education classroom is the 
preferred method of instruction because it can cure or improve the behavior of 
disabled students through peer imitation, thereby increasing self-worth, is 
erroneous;149 and this pervasive belief has stigmatized the special education 
classroom as a degrading placement, unfit for any child, regardless of need.150 The 
special education classroom gives disabled students the quality, individualized 
attention the students need under IDEA, in addition to promoting self-esteem, 
academic progress, and greater preparation for adult life.151 The philosophy behind 
inclusion as an ideal placement not only deprives disabled students of their 
entitlement to an “appropriate” or individualized public education under IDEA, but 
it is maliciously ruining public education through the invidious belief that disabled 
students, separated by a special education classroom, are inferior.152  
Unfortunately, inclusion is still a predominate movement in special education 
law, as exemplified by the many parents in various cases requesting that their 
children be placed in the general education classroom with supplemental aids and 
services.153 Updating the attitudes and inclinations people have of the special 
education classroom will not only improve public education for all students, but it 
will also make IEP meetings more tolerant for all involved. Part of this change 
must come from the courts, as there is a lack of consistency in the standard used to 
determine the appropriate placements for students with disabilities.154 Not only 
would more consistency stifle the need for litigation in this area of law, but it 
would better guide school districts and parents with developing an agreeable IEP 
that meets the benchmarks of a formalized standard. 
 ________________________  
 149. See id. at 820. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See id. 
 152. Dupre, supra note 23, at 819. 
 153. See E.W. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty. Fla., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1366–67 (S.D. Fla. 2004) 
(charging School District with depriving a profoundly deaf child a FAPE in the LRE after incorrectly placing the 
profoundly deaf child “in a verbotonal (VT) therapy program for hearing impaired students at Kenwood 
Elementary School;” as opposed to the parent’s preferred placement in general education with “exceptional 
student support therapy” at Ludlam Elementary School); see R.L. v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 07-20321-
CIV, 2008 WL 3833414, at *12, *19, *25 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2008) (claiming the School District violated IDEA’s 
requirement of providing disabled student with a FAPE in the LRE by “predetermining placement at [Palmetto 
Senior High School],” as opposed to a smaller school environment at MAST Academy); see Sch. Bd. of Lee Cnty., 
Fla. v. M.M., Nos. 2:05-cv-5-FtM-29SPC, 2:05-cv-7-FtM-29SPC, 2007 WL 983274, at *8, *13 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 
27, 2007) (completing the IEP meeting without the parents’ participation and attempting to change M.M.’s 
placement to a more restrictive environment without parental consent caused the parents to request a due process 
hearing to prevent M.M. from changing schools).  
 154. Compare Jane Parent ex rel. John Student v. Osceola Cnty. Sch. Bd., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1249 (M.D. 
Fla. 1999) (citing Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1401–02 (9th Cir. 1994)) (determining 
placement for the disabled student in the least restrictive environment based on factors such as: (1) the academic 
benefits in the general education classroom, with the appropriate aids and services; (2) the non-academic benefits 
of the general education classroom, including the imitation of language and behavior models of the nondisabled 
peers; (3) the disruptive behavior the disabled student might display, which distracts the classroom from serious 
learning; and (4) the cost of education the disabled student in the general education classroom), with L.G. v. Sch. 
Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty., Fla., 512 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1246 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (claiming that B.G.’s least restrictive 
environment was determined based primarily on B.G.’s patterns of behavior; while B.G. was disruptive, he was 
manageable at school and willing to learn in the general education classroom).     
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VI.  POSSIBLE SOLUTION: A FOUR-FACTORED BALANCING TEST FROM THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS 
 
In order to resolve the ongoing obstacle regarding Florida district courts 
applying different standards to determine an appropriate placement for a disabled 
student in the least restrictive environment, these district courts should apply a 
balancing test using specific factors as stipulated in Sacramento City Unified 
School District, Board of Education v. Rachel H., of the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.155 Although originally, the District Court for the Eastern District of 
California relied on the Daniel R.R. and Greer two-pronged test and the Roncker v. 
Walter test, the district court later modified both tests to develop the Rachel H. test, 
which employs balancing four assessable factors.156 After Rachel H. was appealed 
from the district court to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Ninth 
Circuit fully adopted the balancing test originally proscribed in the district court.157  
In order to evaluate a disabled student’s placement under the Rachel H. test, 
the court must look at the following components: (1) the academic benefits the 
disabled child will receive in the general education classroom, with the assistance 
of supplemental aids and services, versus the academic benefits of a self-contained, 
special education classroom; (2) the non-academic benefits the disabled child gains 
by socializing with the student’s nondisabled peers; (3) the effect the disabled 
student’s presence has on the general education classroom; and (4) the cost of 
including the disabled student in the general education classroom.158  
The Rachel H. test is a preferable standard to evaluate a disabled student’s 
placement as opposed to the two-pronged test articulated in Greer, because the 
Rachel H. test assesses the disabled student’s progress with the use of four 
concrete, measurable factors.159 Conversely in Greer, the three components that 
assist in answering the first prong of the inquiry are merely suggestive, 
indeterminate factors that only apply to the particular facts of Greer.160 Although 
the Greer two-pronged test provides the Eleventh Circuit, and its respective district 
courts, with more flexibility when it comes to determining the appropriateness of a 
disabled student’s placement and IEP—especially since each disability is unique—
 ________________________  
 155. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1400–01, 1404 (9th Cir. 
1994).   
 156. Id. at 1404; see Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989); see Greer v. 
Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 696 (11th Cir. 1991); see Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 
1983) (presenting six factors that could be applied in determining an appropriate placement for a disabled student 
including: (1) what program is better to meet the disabled student’s needs, a general education curriculum or a 
self-contained special education classroom; (2) whether services could be provided to the disabled student in a 
“non-segregated environment;” (3) whether the disabled student would benefit academically from inclusion; (4) 
whether the benefits of inclusion are outweighed by the benefits in a self-contained, special education classroom; 
(5) the disruptive behavior of the disabled student in the general education classroom and its effect on serious 
learning taking place for other students in the classroom; and (6) the cost of providing services in the least 
restrictive environment, which is the general education classroom).   
 157. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1404.   
 158. Id. at 1400–01, 1404.   
 159. Id.   
 160. Greer, 950 F.2d at 697. 
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the lack of a measureable test results in inconsistency in the courts.161 It would be 
preferable if the Eleventh Circuit had determinate factors to apply, as opposed to 
elusive inquiries with factors that only pertain to one particular case.162 
Rachel H. involved a mentally handicapped girl, and although Rachel had an 
IQ of 44, her parents sought to increase the time she spent in the general education 
classroom.163 However, the School District rejected the Hollands’s request, finding 
this to be an unsuitable placement, as it would require moving Rachel at least six 
times per day.164 The Hollands appealed the School District’s decision, claiming 
that Rachel learned best if she were included in the general education classroom, 
and would not benefit academically in a special education classroom.165 While the 
School District argued that Rachel was “too severely disabled” to progress 
academically in the general education classroom with her nondisabled peers, the 
hearing officer found in favor of the Hollands, affirming Rachel’s placement in the 
general education classroom.166  
The aggrieved School District appealed to the District Court for the Eastern 
District of California.167 In this landmark case, the district court articulated four 
factors it used to evaluate whether or not Rachel’s placement in the general 
education curriculum was appropriate.168 With regard to the first factor, the 
academic benefits, Rachel was shown to have academically progressed in the 
general education classroom versus the special education classroom because 
Rachel made progress with her IEP goals via learning to count and recite English 
and Hebrew alphabets, and Rachel fully participated in class despite her mental 
handicap.169 Therefore, it was appropriate for her to stay in the general education 
classroom with a supplemental aid and a slight accommodation in the 
curriculum.170  
Under the second component, the non-academic benefits of the general 
education classroom, the district court agreed that Rachel belonged in the general 
education curriculum because of her excitement about school and learning, her new 
friendships, and improved self-confidence.171 Additionally, under the third factor, 
Rachel had a positive effect on the general education classroom because she was 
well behaved, not a distraction to others, and did not interfere with the teacher’s 
ability to provide instruction to the classroom.172 Lastly, the district court found 
that the School District failed to meet its burden of showing how educating Rachel 
in the general education classroom would be substantially more expensive than 
 ________________________  
 161. See id. at 696–97.  
 162. See id. at 697 (noting that “[t]hese factors do not constitute an exhaustive list; they are factors that 
happen to be applicable to the facts of the case”).  
 163. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1400. 
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. at 1400–01.   
 169. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1401.   
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
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educating her in a special education classroom.173 In addition, Rachel only needed a 
part time aid, and not a full time aid, which was a recommendation stemming from 
the School District.174 
The district court found in favor of the Hollands, and the School District 
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.175 Although the Ninth 
Circuit could not determine an appropriate placement for Rachel after hearing the 
appeal, the court found that the determination the district court made was in 
compliance with the requirements set forth in IDEA based on the four-factored 
balancing test articulated in the district court’s holding.176 Rachel’s placement in 
the general education classroom was affirmed.177  
While many professionals in various school districts may find Rachel’s 
placement determination controversial, the clarity in the balancing test employed in 
Rachel H. is a substantial improvement to having an elusive test with no concrete 
factors to apply uniformly. 
VII.  APPLICATION OF THE RACHEL H. TEST 
The Rachel H. balancing test, promulgated in 1994, is a significant benchmark 
in special education law because it provides a clear list of tangible factors the IEP 
team can measure using objective data.178 In a span of twenty years, the Rachel H. 
test is still a guideline for school districts and parents to utilize during IEP meetings 
within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit.179 Hence the rationale of why, the 
Eleventh Circuit, and its requisite school districts, should consider adopting a test 
that mirrors the Rachel H. four-factored balancing test.180  
As an example of the how the Rachel H. test is applied, it is recommended to 
look at cases that abide by the four factors.181 In Yates v. Washoe County School 
District, District Court for the District of Nevada applied the four factors of the 
Rachel H. test and held that the student, Stevie Yates, received a free and 
appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment by spending part 
of the day in a resource room for mathematics, and the remaining part of the day 
with his nondisabled peers in the general education classroom.182  
 ________________________  
 173. Id. at 1401–02.   
 174. Id. at 1402.   
 175. See Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1402.  
 176. Id. at 1403, 1405.   
 177. Id. at 1405.   
 178. Id. at 1400–01, 1404.   
 179. See Yates v. Washoe Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 03:07-CV-00200-LRH-RJJ, 2008 WL 4106816, at *4 (D. 
Nev. Aug. 28, 2008) (citing Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1400–01, 1404); see also C.L. v. Lucia Mar Unified Sch. Dist., 
No. CV 12-9713 CAS (PJWx), 2014 WL 117339, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2014) (citing Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 
1400–01, 1404) (applying the Rachel H. test to determine the amount of time C.L. spent in the general education 
classroom versus the special education classroom was compliant with the mandates under IDEA because C.L. 
receives a more meaningful, academic benefit in a smaller, more structured setting, than he does in a larger setting, 
where he is disruptive to his nondisabled peers).  
 180. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1400–01, 1404.   
 181. See id. 
 182. See Yates v. Washoe Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 03:07-CV-00200-LRH-RJJ, 2008 WL 4106816, at *4, *6 
(D. Nev. Aug. 28, 2008) (citing Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1400–01, 1404).  
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However, the plaintiffs, which included Stevie’s guardian ad litem and his 
parents, contended that Stevie did not receive a free and appropriate education in 
the least restrictive environment at Reno High School when he was removed from 
the general education classroom and moved to a special education classroom for 
further instruction in mathematics.183 As a result, a civil action commenced after 
the plaintiffs exhausted their procedural remedies under IDEA.184 
Stevie, a student that suffered from autism and apraxia—a motor disorder that 
inhibits speech—used technological devices to communicate; and over time, Stevie 
made progress articulating his thoughts to his teachers and peers via the 
technological devices.185 Despite Stevie’s progress with communicating to others, 
he was still functioning at a below-average cognitive level for his age; and 
therefore, Stevie would graduate with a special education diploma.186  
During the 2004–05 school year, Stevie spent about eighty-eight percent of the 
school day in the general education classroom, where he accomplished some of his 
objectives and showed progress towards meeting his other goals, as set forth in his 
2004–05 IEP.187 Stevie’s progress for that school year was measured through 
quarterly specialized progress reports, district report cards, and a communication 
log from Stevie’s assistant.188 Stevie’s 2005–06 IEP was relatively the same as his 
2004–05 IEP, except that Stevie would receive English instruction in the special 
education classroom because of his inability to receive a meaningful benefit in the 
general education classroom.189  
However, controversy arose during the IEP team’s annual meeting held on 
April 5, 2006, when discussing new goals for Stevie in his proposed IEP for the 
2006–07 school year.190 The Washoe County School District suggested, using data 
from Stevie’s most recent progress reports, that it would academically benefit 
Stevie if he spent sixty percent of the school day in the general education 
classroom, as opposed to the eighty-eight percent of the school day Stevie was 
currently spending in the general education classroom.191 With this newly proposed 
IEP, Stevie would receive mathematics instruction, English instruction, and 
vocational instruction in the special education classroom for forty percent of the 
school day, and then spend the remaining sixty percent of the school day in the 
general education classroom.192 The plaintiffs rejected this proposed IEP for the 
2006–07 school year and filed a due process complaint with the Hearing Officer.193 
Ultimately, the Hearing Officer agreed with the School District, and found that 
in addition to English instruction and vocational instruction, mathematics 
 ________________________  
 183. Id. at *1–2. 
 184. See id. at *1.  
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id.  
 188. Yates, 2008 WL 4106816, at *1. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See id. at *1–2. 
 191. Id. at *2.  
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
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instruction in a special education classroom would provide Stevie with more of a 
meaningful, academic benefit than the general education classroom, and this new 
placement would still remain compliant with the LRE requirement under IDEA.194 
The plaintiffs appealed the Hearing Officer’s determination; yet, the State Review 
Officer affirmed Stevie’s new placement for mathematics instruction using the 
Rachel H. four-factored balancing test.195 Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs appealed 
the State Review Officer’s decision to the District Court of Nevada, still claiming 
that this new placement violates Stevie’s free and appropriate education in the least 
restrictive environment under IDEA.196 
In order to determine whether Stevie’s new placement for mathematics in the 
special education classroom was appropriate and in compliance with IDEA, the 
court applied the Rachel H. four-factored balancing test.197 Under the first prong, 
the court considered “the educational benefits of placement full-time in a regular 
class.”198 Based on this first prong, the court also agreed that Stevie would receive 
a more meaningful benefit in the special education classroom for mathematics 
instruction than in the general education classroom.199 This determination came 
from the School District’s autism specialist, Jill Barlow, who was assigned to 
Stevie; and she testified that Stevie had not made any meaningful improvements in 
mathematics during the time when mathematics instruction was held in the general 
education classroom in the preceding school years.200 In addition, Barlow 
recommended that Stevie would gain more of an academic benefit in mathematics 
if he were in a “smaller setting . . . [receiving] verbal instruction from an adult.”201 
Under the second prong of the Rachel H. four-factored test, the court 
considered “the non-academic benefits of such a placement [Stevie would receive 
in the general education classroom].”202 In Yates, the court did not weigh this 
specific factor as heavily as the other four factors because Stevie still spent sixty 
percent of the school day in the general education classroom; and so Stevie was 
communicating with his nondisabled peers during this time frame when he was in 
the general education classroom.203 Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to provide 
evidence that Stevie was missing out on non-academic opportunities in the general 
education classroom when he left the class to attend mathematics instruction in the 
special education classroom.204 
Under the third prong of the Rachel H. four-factored test, the Court considered 
“the effect [the student] had on the teacher and children in the regular class.”205 
 ________________________  
 194. Yates, 2008 WL 4106816, at *2. 
 195. Id. (citing Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1400–01, 1404 
(9th Cir. 1994)).  
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at *4 (citing Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1403–04). 
 198. Id. (quoting Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1400–01, 1404). 
 199. Id. at *5. 
 200. Yates, 2008 WL 4106816, at *5. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at *3, *5 (quoting Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1400–01, 1404). 
 203. Id. at *5.  
 204. Id.  
 205. Id. at *3, *5 (quoting Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1400–01, 1404). 
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Here, the court found that Stevie’s presence in the general education classroom 
during mathematics instruction was distracting to his nondisabled peers because 
Stevie required direct instruction from an adult separate from the teacher.206 This 
intensive instruction, necessary for Stevie to obtain his mathematics skills, was 
disruptive to the general education classroom, a place for serious learning to 
occur.207 
In Yates, the court did not consider the final factor of the Rachel H. balancing 
test, which is “the costs of mainstreaming [the student]” because it was not 
applicable to the facts in the case.208 Nevertheless, by using the straightforward 
guidelines of the Rachel H. four-factored test, IEP meetings will be more 
predictable and run smoother if objective data that meets each prong of the four-
factored test can be clearly shown.209                    
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Special education classes are helpful solutions that give students with 
disabilities the individual assistance they need to progress academically and build 
lifelong skills.210 They are also a place where students can receive an educational 
curriculum catered to their unique needs, thereby meeting the “free and 
appropriate” requirement under IDEA.211 Although the special education classroom 
is not in the “least restrictive environment” as per the second requirement under 
IDEA,212 perhaps it is time for lawmakers and parents to realize that students with 
disabilities may progress better, academically and non-academically, in a more 
restrictive environment. The perceptions that “inclusion” will cure or improve the 
disabled student via imitation of the student’s nondisabled peers, or that the special 
education room is an inferior placement, are not only erroneous, but are creating 
problems for educators, disabled students, and nondisabled students, as serious 
learning in the public school system is not taking place.213 Additionally, as the 
needs of the disabled students and nondisabled students conflict, the presumption 
that inclusion is best for disabled students is not fully addressing the particular 
educational needs of either type of student.214  
In order to improve this dilemma, the Eleventh Circuit should adopt a 
standardized test for the lower courts to adhere. A uniform list of components, 
measured by using data, is a solution that will enhance cohesiveness between 
school personnel and the parents of disabled students during IEP meetings.215 A list 
 ________________________  
 206. Yates, 2008 WL 4106816, at *5–6. 
 207. Id. at *6. 
 208. Id. at *4 (quoting Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1400–01, 1404). 
 209. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1400–01, 1404. 
 210. See Dupre, supra note 23, at 828–29. 
 211. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (West 2005).  
 212. See § 1412(a)(5)(A). 
 213. See Dupre, supra note 23, at 819–20. 
 214. See Roberts, supra note 14, at 1072. 
 215. See Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1400–01, 1404 (9th 
Cir. 1994). 
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of measurable factors will also objectively place students with disabilities in a 
classroom where the student would receive meaningful educational benefits, as 
opposed to a classroom where the student is arranged to have unattainable goals. If 
school districts and parents really worked for the best interest of the student during 
the IEP meeting, and placed students together based on their compatibility needs, 
then all students would increase their academic benefits without compromising the 






 ________________________  
 216. See Roberts, supra note 14, at 1090. 
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